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The Chapter VII Powers of the United
Nations Charter: Do They "Trump"
Human Rights Law?
I. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Charter ("Charter"), signed at the 1945 San
Francisco Conference,' represents the world's initial response to two
world wars and the atrocities of the Hitler regime.2 Although the
Charter proposes multiple purposes and principles, it provides the
means with which to implement only one of these purposes, the main-
tenance of peace and security.
3
The power to maintain international peace and security, vested in
the Security Council ("Council") by article 42 of the Charter, argua-
bly conflicts with the Charter's purpose of "promoting and encourag-
ing respect for human rights and... fundamental freedoms," set forth
in article 1.4 Further, the subsequent evolution of human rights law,
which implements article 1, raises the possibility that the Council's
unfettered exercise of its sanctioning power violates customary human
rights law.
This Comment explores whether the Council may violate human
rights law when executing its peace-keeping powers. The language of
the Charter appears to vest unlimited power in the Council. This
1. U.N. CHARTER; LELAND M. GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS 8 (3d ed. 1969).
2. RuTH B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 227 (1958); see
also Opening Session of the Conference, Doc. 7, 2 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 6 (1945) [hereinafter Open-
ing Session]. "We must not continue to sacrifice... our youth merely to check madmen, those
who in every age plan world domination." Id. at 6.
3. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 41, 42. Article 39 declares that the Security Council "shall
determine" whether a breach of peace has occurred, and "shall make recommendations or
decide what measures shall be taken." Id. art. 39. Article 41 provides that the Security Coun-
cil "may decide what measures... to... employo... and... [may] call upon Members... to
apply such measures." Id. art. 41. Article 42 states that the Security Council "may take such
action... as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces
of Members of the United Nations." Id. art. 42. These articles affirmatively empower the
Security Council to take action. In contrast, article 62 merely empowers the Economic and
Social Council to "make recommendations," and article 13 limits the power of the General
Assembly to "initiate studies and make recommendations" regarding the promotion of inter-
national cooperation in areas such as economics and human rights. Id. arts. 13(b), 62.
4. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 3.
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Comment suggests that the Charter's historical context and the draft-
ers' intent justify a broad interpretation of the sanctioning power and
that this interpretation is consistent with a primary purpose of the
Charter, the maintenance of peace and security. It concludes that the
Council's power is limited, but not as the direct result of customary
human rights law. This Comment suggests that these limits are due
to rules of statutory interpretation and the implications of subsequent
actions of the United Nations.
II. THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
The United Nations Charter is an agreement among nations that
creates a multipurpose organization known as the United Nations. 5
The Charter creates six principal organs, and provides for the estab-
lishment of any necessary subsidiary organs.6 The principal organs
are the General Assembly, 7 the Security Council,8 the Economic and
Social Council,9 the Trusteeship Council, 10 the International Court of
Justice, 1 and the Secretariat.' 2 The Charter defines each organ's
powers and functions in great detail. It does not, however, empower
the United Nations to operate as a government.' 3
The Charter offers membership in the United Nations to all
"peaceloving states which accept the obligations contained in the...
Charter."' 4 It obligates each member nation to settle disputes peace-
fully, and to refrain from the use of, or the threat of, force. Member
nations are also required to assist the United Nations in actions taken
in accordance with the Charter, and to refrain from assisting states
against which the United Nations is taking action.' 5 Members that
violate Charter principles may have their memberships, or at least the
privileges of their memberships, withdrawn. 16
5. U.N. CHARTER; LELAND M. GOODRICH, THE UNITED NATIONS 28-29 (1959).
6. U.N. CHARTER art. 7, 1 1; GOODRICH, supra note 5, at 32.
7. U.N. CHARTER arts. 9-22.
8. Id. arts. 23-32.
9. Id. arts. 61-72.
10. Id. arts. 86-91.
11. Id. arts. 92-96.
12. Id. arts. 97-101.
13. GOODRICH, supra note 5, at 27. The United Nations is not intended to be the "gov-
ernment" of the world; that is, it is not designed to govern the governments of the individual
nations. Id.
14. U.N. CHARTER art. 4, T 1.
15. Id. art. 2.
16. Id. art. 6.
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A. Historical Influences, the Structure of Power, and the Intent of
the Drafters
History and recent events dominated the atmosphere of the San
Francisco Conference ("Conference"), and heavily influenced the
drafters' decisions during the Charter's creation. The drafters' desire
to avoid future wars prompted the establishment of a strong decision-
making body. Indeed, the power structure created in the Charter,
and the language defining that power, reflect a paramount desire to
create a powerful peace-keeping organization.
1. Historical Influences
The memories of two world wars, culminating in the Nazi atroci-
ties, lay in the hearts and minds of the delegates at the Conference.1
7
With these memories as their catalyst, the delegates sought to "pre-
vent the repetition of a new tragedy... to make impossible the occur-
rence of a new aggression and a new war."18 Indeed, the sole
objective of the Conference was to "provide the machinery which
[would] make future peace not only possible but certain," 19 for the
members believed that, without security, life itself was at stake.20
The necessity and fear that gave birth to the United Nations
greatly influenced the power structure created by the delegates. 21 To
avoid the same failure as the Covenant of the League of Nations, 22 the
delegates vested central decision-making powers in the Council and
17. President Truman's speech in the opening session of the Conference evidences this
mindset, as he reminded the delegates that they had "lived through the torture and the tragedy
of two world conflicts .... " Opening Session, supra note 2, at 6. See also GOODRICH, supra
note 5, at 320 ("The world had been shocked by the Nazi treatment of racial, religious, and
national minority groups before and during the war.").
18. MAURICE WATERS, From Dreams to Reality, in THE UNITED NATIONS: INTERNA-
TIONAL ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION 15 (1967) (quoting U.S.S.R. Ambassador An-
drei Gromyko).
19. Opening Session, supra note 2, at 7 (quoting President Harry S. Truman).
20. Speech in the Opening Debate, Doc. 8, 1 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 552 (1945).
21. WATERS, supra note 18, at 14.
22. The League of Nations ("League"), like the United Nations, was formed at the con-
clusion of a tragic war. GOODRICH, supra note 5, at 8. It was established by the League of
Nations Covenant ("Covenant") as an organization comprised of three main organs: the As-
sembly, the Council, and the Secretariat. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT; GOODRICH,
supra note 5, at 12-13. The Covenant also established a Permanent Court of International
Justice. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT; GOODRICH, supra note 5, at 13. Even non-mem-
bers of the League, such .as the United States, could join this court. LEAGUE OF NATIONS
COVENANT; GOODRICH, supra note 5, at 13.
The primary purpose of the League was to maintain peace. GOODRICH, supra note 5, at
1991]
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clearly defined the functions and powers of the other organs.23 In do-
ing so, the delegates rejected a suggestion to subordinate the Council's
power to the General Assembly by refusing to require the Council to
exercise its powers "under the authority" of the General Assembly.24
This structure of independent executive power, motivated by the de-
sire to create a stronger system to ensure "prompt and effective action
by the United Nations... for the maintenance of international peace
and security," supports the conclusion that the drafters intended the
Council's powers to be broad.25
2. Powers of the Security Council
The functions and powers of the Council are defined by the
Charter. Article 24 "confer[s] on the Security Council primary re-
sponsibility for the maintenance of international peace and secur-
ity."' 26 To allow the Council to fulfill this primary responsibility, the
Charter also vests the Council with peace-keeping powers.
27
Chapter VII of the Charter authorizes the Council to counteract
threats to peace, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression. 28 Article
10. Nonetheless, recognizing the importance of favorable economic, social, and political con-
ditions in the pursuit of peace, the founders also sought international cooperation. Id.
The demise of the League was based, in part, upon its failure to grant the Assembly or
Council any effective means of coordinating the actions of its members. LELAND M. GOOD-
RICH, The UN Security Council, in THE UNITED NATIONS: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 18
(1972) [hereinafter GOODRICH, UN SECURrrY COUNCIL]. The Covenant limited the Council's
power to making recommendations, and relied on its member states to enforce the collective
security by applying economic sanctions against violating states. Id. The members' obliga-
tions to institute military measures to enforce peace were merely moral. Id.
23. U.N. CHARTER arts. 24, 41; GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 311.
24. GOODRICH, UN SECURITY COUNCIL, supra note 22, at 25. Under article 11 of the
Charter, the General Assembly's power is limited to considering and making recommenda-
tions with respect to general principles relating to the maintenance of peace and security. U.N.
CHARTER art. 11. Article 24 of the Charter vests the Council with "primary" responsibility
for the maintenance of peace and security. Id. art. 24.
Article 12 of the Charter specifically prohibits the Assembly from making "any recom-
mendation with regard to [a] dispute or situation" while the Council is exercising its functions
under the Charter, unless the Council so requests. Id. art. 12, 1. Further, article 11 requires
the Assembly to refer to the Council "any such question on which action is necessary." Id.
art. 11, 2.
25. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, 1.
26. Id. art. 24.
27. Id. arts. 39-51.
28. Id. art. 39. The drafters intentionally did not define or describe what constitutes
aggression, although various proposals were offered. The drafters feared that an established
definition or formula would be over- or under-inclusive, sometimes resulting in inappropriate
or premature United Nations enforcement measures. CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
REPORTS TO THE PRESIDENT 91-92 (1969) [hereinafter REPORTS].
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42 affirmatively vests the Council with the power to "take such action
... as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security.' 29 To invoke its article 42 powers, the Council need only.
"consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inade-
quate or have proved to be inadequate. ' ' 30 Therefore, while article 41
outlines a non-exhaustive list of non-force measures available to the
Council, such as the interruption of economic relations,3' article 42
increases the Council's power to allow the use of force, including
blockades. 32 Similar to article 41, article 42's enumerated list of force-
ful measures is not exclusive.
33
The Charter's power originates from the governments of the re-
spective signatory nations34 through representatives who accepted the
29. U.N. CHARTER art. 42 (emphasis added). In its entirety, article 42 reads as follows:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would
be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or
land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and secur-
ity. Such action may include demonstrations, blockades, and other operations by air,
sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.
Id.
30. Id.
31. U.N. CHARTER art. 41. "These [non-force measures] may include the complete or
partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal telegraphic, radio, and
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations." Id.; see also
GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 311-12.
32. U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
33. GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 315.
34. GOODRICH, supra note 5, at 62. "The Charter is an agreement between states....
[T]he Organization rests on the consent of its Members." Id. The 51 original signatories to
the Charter are as follows: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Byelorussian SSR,
Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hondu-
ras, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, South Af-
rica, Syria, Turkey, Ukrainian SSR, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, USSR, Vene-
zuela, and Yugoslavia. China was represented in the United Nations by the government of the
Republic of China until October 25, 1971. Since then, China has been represented by the
government of the People's Republic of China. The Republic of China is no longer a member
of the United Nations and has no representation.
There are 108 non-signatory nations admitted under article 4, which offers membership to
all "peaceloving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter." They
are: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Bahamas,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burma,
Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cyprus,
Djibouti, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Germany (East), Ger-
many (West), Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Indone-
sia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kampuchea, Kenya, Kuwait,
Laos, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Papua,
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Charter in its current form." 35 The acceptance by member nations
validates the Council's article 42 powers, as they are an integral com-
ponent of the Charter. Further validation of the Council's powers is
found in article 25, which declares that "[m]embers of the United Na-
tions agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Coun-
cil ... *"36
a. Plain Language of the Charter
The Charter's plain language vests enormous power in the Coun-
cil to respond to threats, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression.
Article 42 indicates that the Council's power is limited to that which
is "necessary" to maintain or restore peace and security. 37 Therefore,
the Council may employ any and all measures as may be necessary, 38
including force, until peace is restored and no longer threatened. Fur-
ther, article 39 indicates that the Council must take action: "The Se-
curity Council . . . shall make recommendations, or decide what
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to
maintain or restore ... peace and security," once the Council "deter-
mine[s] the existence of any threat to ... [or] breach of the peace, or
act of aggression. ' 39 Thus, the plain language of the Charter not only
grants the Council broad powers, but demands that the Council take
action.
3. The Drafters' Intent
The broad language of chapter VII creates a potential conflict
because the Council's exercise of its enforcement powers may contra-
vene Charter provisions fostering goals other than the maintenance of
peace and security. This raises questions as to which purpose should
Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Si-
erra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Christopher and Nevis,
St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Tanzania,
Thailand, Togo, Trinidad, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Upper Volta, Vanuatu,
Vietnam, Yemen, Yemen (Democratic), Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. U.N. CHARTER art.
4, 1; BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., BAsIc DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
WORLD ORDER 894-95 (2d ed. 1990).
35. See U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
36. Id. art. 25.
37. Id. art. 42. The Council "may take such action ... as may be necessary to maintain
or restore international peace and security." Id. (emphasis added).
38. Id. The power to determine what is "necessary" is a power vested solely in the Secur-
ity Council: "Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security
Council." U.N. CHARTER art. 11, 1 2.
39. Id. art. 39 (emphasis added).
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prevail in the case of conflict. Specifically, which purpose prevails if
by exercising its sanctioning powers to promote the maintenance of
peace and security, the Council simultaneously violates the human
rights of those it is sanctioning? Perhaps the most pointed and direct
answer is reflected in the Chairman of the Coordination Committee's
statement during the Committee's twenty-first meeting.4° Chairman
Leo Pasvolsky of the United States stated:
[T]he sole purpose of the Organization is the maintenance of peace
and security, which is not to be confused with the objectives or
principles covered by other articles. Article 1 is governed by the
words "to maintain peace and security" and envisages a breach of
the peace as the final point of danger.
41
Indeed, all who participated in the organization of the United Nations
agreed with this view.42
The drafters of the Charter set forth its purposes in both the pre-
amble and article 1.43 Although the preamble is not clearly distin-
guishable from article 1, it is considered an expression of the drafters'
common intentions, embodying the member nations' motivation for
forming the United Nations." In comparison, article 1 sets forth the
common ends upon which the drafters agreed; that is, the purposes to
40. Documents of the Coordination Committee, Doc. 5180, 17 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 139-40
(1954) [hereinafter Documents of the Coordination Committee].
41. Id. Although the Charter's language indicates that the maintenance of peace and
security was not the United Nation's sole purpose, Mr. Pasvolsky's comment clearly indicates
that it was the purpose that most strongly motivated the Conference delegates.
42. GOODRICH, supra note 5, at 41. "Though the United Nations was initially conceived
as an organization with a number of purposes, all who participated in its establishment were
agreed that its primary purpose-the purpose which must be achieved if other purposes were
to be attained-was the maintenance of international peace and security." Id.
43. U.N. CHARTER pmbl., art. 1.
44. GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 20. The preamble states:
WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our life-
time has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small,
and
to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations aris-
ing from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and
to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.
AND FOR THESE ENDS
1991]
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which the member nations ultimately subscribed. 45 Article 1 enumer-
ates four distinct purposes, the ordering of which is instructive, as it
graphically displays the drafters' intent to raise the goal of maintain-
ing peace and security above all others.46 Paragraph one states, as the
first of the United Nations' purposes, "[t]o maintain international
peace and security, and ... to take effective collective measures" to
achieve that end.47 This purpose is reinforced by the preamble's ini-
tial sentence, which embodies the drafters' desire to "save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war."'48 Subsequent to the purpose of
maintaining peace and security, the drafters addressed the issue of
human rights. In paragraph three, article 1 declares the member na-
tions' desire to achieve international cooperation in the promotion of
human rights.49 This purpose is supported by the preamble's state-
ment of the drafters' desire "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human
to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good
neighbours, and
to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that
armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social
-advancement of all peoples.
HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE
AIMS
Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in
the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good
and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do
hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.
U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
45. G OODRICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 20.
46. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1. Article 1 states:
Article 1. The Purposes of the United Nations are:
(1) To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effec-
tive collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and
for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring
about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and interna-
tional law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which
might lead to a breach of the peace;
(2) To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the princi-
ple of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate
measures to strengthen universal peace;
(3) To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encour-
aging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinc-
tion as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
(4) To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of
these common ends.
Id. art. 1, 1-4.
47. Id. art. 1, 1.
48. Id. at pmbl.
49. Id. art. 1, $ 3.
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rights." 50
The drafters' ordering of these purposes, in conjunction with the
Charter provisions, demonstrates the primary significance of preserv-
ing peace.51 The drafters thus emphasized their concern for the main-
tenance of peace and security by addressing these issues in both the
preamble and article 1, and by addressing human rights concerns only
after addressing peace and security.
52
The drafters' choice of words also indicates a more guided pur-
pose regarding peace and security, as article 1 expressly provides col-
lective measures to prevent and remove threats to peace and to
suppress aggression. 53 Further, the drafters specifically rejected a
proposed amendment to article 1 that would have required "collective
measures [to] be taken in accordance with international law and jus-
tice,"'54 because it would have "tie[d] the hands of the Security Coun-
cil to an undesirable extent." 55 This refusal implies the primacy of the
peace function.
In contrast, the Charter's language fails to illustrate the drafters'
goal of protecting human rights. Because the drafters did not intend
to vest the United Nations with governmental powers to address eco-
nomic and social problems, 56 the Charter does not secure human
rights. Rather, it seeks only to obtain international cooperation in
"promoting and encouraging respect for human rights. T57 Even arti-
cle 56, which demands a pledge from members to "co-operate[] with
the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Ar-
ticle 55," requires very little of member nations in light of article 55,
which merely states that the United Nations "shall promote" certain
goals. 58 Article 55 not only fails to define what constitutes acceptable
standards for members to meet with respect to these goals, it fails to
define what constitutes acceptable cooperation. Thus, even the pledge
in article 55 reflects little more than the desire topromote cooperation
50. Id. pmbl.
51. GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 25-26.
52. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1-4; GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 25.
53. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1.
54. GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 27-28.
55. Id. at 28.
56. GOODRICH, supra note 5, at 27.
57. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, $ 3.
58. Id. arts. 55, 56. Article 55 of the Charter reads as follows:
Article 55. With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on re-
1991]
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between nations to solve common problems. 59 This idea is further
supported by the fact that article 2 of the Charter expressly denies the
United Nations authority "to intervene in matters . . . essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state," unless the matter be-
comes an international concern.6o
One may argue that subsequent conventions and treaties have
elevated human rights to an international concern, placing human
rights within the purview of the United Nations. 61 Nonetheless, the
drafters' refusal to amend article 1 to restrict collective measures to
those taken in accordance with international law62 substantiates the
fact that all other purposes in the Charter are subordinate to the
drafters' primary concern of maintaining peace and security, because
human rights law is subsumed by international law. Further, the
strong language of chapter VII, empowering the Council, 63 supports
an interpretation that the Charter vests broad enforcement powers in
the Council to effectuate the promotion of peace.64
spect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United
Nations shall promote:
(a) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and
social progress and development;
(b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and
international cultural and educational co-operation; and
(c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental free-
doms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
Id. art. 55.
59. GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 35.
60. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7. It is difficult to determine when a matter becomes an
international concern, and whether a violation has occurred upon which the United Nations
can act. Indeed, even if a precise line could be drawn, political circumstances could cause it to
change at any time. JAMES F. GREEN, UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 662 (1956).
61. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1984/72 (1984) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]; International Conven-
tion Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/146, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46,
at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/786 (1979); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) [hereinafter
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]; Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Rec-
ognized by the Charter of Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/236 (1946) [hereinafter Nuremberg].
62. GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 27-28.
63. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51.
64. This is not to suggest, however, that blind violations of human rights are a natural
consequence of this conclusion.
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III. POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL
The Charter's structure and language reflect the drafters' intent
to create a strong peace-keeping organization. However, outside fac-
tors may guide the interpretation of the Charter, such that its broad
language may be limited in its application. Statutory rules of con-
struction, subsequent actions of the United Nations, and prevailing
international law all potentially limit the meaning of the Charter's
language.
A. Governing Rules of Interpretation
According to rules of statutory construction, the greatest limit on
a provision is often other provisions within the same instrument.
Generally, a document is construed and assumed to be internally con-
sistent. 65 Seemingly conflicting provisions are interpreted in a manner
that preserves the instrument as a whole, and does not render any one
provision meaningless. 66 Therefore, the Charter's enforcement provi-
sion, which supports one of its purposes and conflicts with others,
must be construed so as to allow all Charter purposes to co-exist.
67
Accordingly, the human rights provisions of articles 1 and 55 must
limit the broad enforcement language of chapter VII.68 Despite the
drafters' intent to prevent war and ensure peace, the human rights
provisions must also be given meaning.
The proposition that the United Nations must enforce the Char-
ter's human rights provisions finds support in the opening speech of
Norway's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Trygve Lie, at the Charter
Conference. 69 Lie, later elected Secretary-General, addressed the
Charter's multiplicity of purposes. 70 While acknowledging the impor-
tance of achieving peace, Lie encouraged the Conference to include
the preservation of human rights as one of its concerns. 71 Lie's state-
ment that "[d]aily bread turns to stone unless eaten in freedom and
65. SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCIiON § 46.05 (Dallas C. Sands ed., 4th ed.
1984).
66. Id. § 46.06.
67. Id. "The construction that produces the greatest harmony and the least inconsis-
tency is that which ought to prevail." Id.
68. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 39-51, 55.
69. Speech in the Opening Debate, supra note 20, at 27.
70. Id.
71. According to Lie, "All the members of the United Nations are bound together.., by
their vital interest] in protection against aggression." Id.
19911
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with human dignity" illuminates the essence and importance of these
two purposes.72
Thus, interpreting any Charter provision in light of the others
limits the interpretation of that one provision.7 3 Therefore, the
human rights provisions of the Charter must narrow the otherwise
broad powers vested in the Council by chapter VII.
B. Subsequent Actions of the United Nations
Other potential limitations on chapter VII's broad enforcement
language are the subsequent actions and decisions of the United Na-
tions. Although the United Nations initially found it difficult to im-
plement the Charter's human rights provisions, subsequent United
Nations resolutions gave substance to these vague provisions.
At the time of the Charter's drafting, the concept of global
human rights was relatively new. Indeed, the drafters failed to agree
upon a definition of "human rights" and, as such, the term remains
undefined in the Charter.7
4
Early international resolutions, "couched in very general terms,"
offered hope that an agreement would be reached in the area of global
human rights,75 but subsequent attempts to apply these basic human
rights principles revealed a split between communist and democratic
countries, and between developed and underdeveloped countries.76
For example, many controversies arose "over the nature of the powers
and functions of the United Nations organs and the extent to which
the United Nations [could] act without violating the domestic juris-
diction clause in Article 2(7) of the Charter. ' 77 Consequently, imple-
mentation of the Charter's human rights provisions has proven
difficult.
Despite these difficulties, the United Nations' efforts to promote
human rights help define the nature and extent of the limitations that
the Charter's human rights provisions place on other Charter provi-
sions.78 In fact, the United Nations' efforts to translate the general
72. Id. at 28.
73. SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUIMON, supra note 65, § 46.05. The purposes
that motivate a lawmaker to write a particular enactment pose "an implied limitation on the
sense of general terms, and a touchstone for the expansion of narrower terms." Id.
74. GREEN, supra note 60, at 643.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 645.
78. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
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goals of human rights into precise language resulted in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,79 the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights,80 and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights.8 l These documents give substance to the
Charter's human rights provisions, and lend credibility to their pres-
ence in the Charter.
82
In addition, some actions taken by the United Nations are in-
structive as to potential limits on the Council's chapter VII powers.
For example, the fact that the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, as well as the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, focuses on individual rights, rather than
state rights, 83 and the existence of resolutions against torture and ge-
nocide,8 4 suggest that the Council may be precluded from employing
its enormous powers on one individual to effect its goal of maintaining
peace and security.85 This concept is amplified by the United Na-
tions' formal recognition of the principles underlying the Nuremberg
Tribunal's condemnation of Nazi war criminals.8 6 Such recognition
2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) [hereinafter
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal
Declaration]; and Nuremberg, supra note 61.
79. Universal Declaration, supra note 78.
80. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 61.
81. Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 78; GREEN, supra note
60, at 708. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is generally understood to set forth
goals and standards for governments, while the two covenants define the rights of individuals
as subjects of international law. Id. at 663.
82. The credibility of the Charter's human rights provisions is questionable in light of
rules of statutory interpretation, the Charter's plain language, and the drafters' intent. Be-
cause no definitions are included in the Charter, and because the Charter only "encourages"
members to promote human rights, the Charter affords little assistance to one attempting to
glean the meaning of the human rights provisions. Further, it is difficult to ascertain the pa-
rameters that the human rights provisions place on the Council's enforcement powers, because
the weight of these provisions, relative to the Council's enforcement powers, is unclear. The
problem is further exacerbated by evidence of the drafters' intent, which supports the proposi-
tion that maintaining peace and security preempts all other goals.
83. Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 78; Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, supra note 61; GREEN, supra note 60, at 663.
84. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture, supra note 61.
85. For example, assume that during the 1990 Gulf War the Security Council authorized
the kidnapping and torture of Saddam Hussein's mother. Although the action would be an
attempt to restore world peace and suppress Hussein's aggression, it would certainly constitute
outrageous conduct, despite the Council's ability to "decide what measures not involving the
use of armed forces are to be employed to give effect to [their] decision[s]." U.N. CHARTER
art. 40.
86. Nuremberg, supra note 61. "[The war criminals] were convicted for political, racial,
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may limit the Council's power, suggesting that the Council cannot
exercise its power to determine that a particular state, individual, or
group of people poses a threat to the peace, if politics, religion, or race
are the exclusive criterion. 7 Accordingly, the Council may be con-
strained from authorizing force or sanctions against a nation that it
determines to be a threat to peace, if such determination is based
solely on these factors.88 This does not suggest, however, that the
Council cannot meet an actual threat to peace with responsive force in
an effort to debilitate an aggressive state. Rather, the goals of peace
and security can be achieved through such means, so long as they are
not motivated by politics, race, or religion.
The Charter authorizes the Council to escalate force only after
less forceful measures have proven ineffective.8 9 However, it is un-
clear whether such escalated military strategies employed to debilitate
an aggressive nation would be considered outrageous and abusive if
they endangered civilian populations. 9° Moreover, it is unclear
whether the authorization of biological, chemical, or nuclear warfare
lies beyond the Council's power when the survival of the world is at
risk. These warfare techniques may be permissible, so long as they
are initiated and executed in an attempt to gain control over aggres-
sion that threatens human existence. 91
and religious persecutions committed against any civilian population." HUMAN RIGHrS IN
THE WORLD COMMUNITY 46 (Richard P. Claude & Bums H. Weston eds., 1989).
87. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. Once the Council determines that a threat to peace exists, it
may take action under articles 41 and 42, and employ force to maintain peace. This scenario
closely parallels the rationale employed by the Nazis to reach their desired end. The Nurem-
berg trials "were a protest against the erasure of the individual as a subject, mediate or imme-
diate, of international law." HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY, supra note 86, at
46.
88. This would be a scenario in which the United Nations utilizes its power under article
39, and determines that a particular state or group of people is threatening world peace merely
because of its views or practices. This scenario assumes that no true aggression or breach of
the peace was committed, but merely that a threat to peace exists. Additionally, the determi-
nation, based on these factors, that a threat exists is suspect.
89. U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
90. An example is the total blockade of an aggressive state.
91. Due to the existence of the United Nations documents prohibiting the use of geno-
cide, and chemical and nuclear warfare, this use of force is envisioned only in extremely rare
situations. Nonetheless, "rare" is certainly not the equivalent of "never." Indeed, as technol-
ogy advances, the perpetration of mass destruction falls within the power of every human
being. For example, it is conceivable that a homogeneous society could infect its population
with biological contagions only destructive to other cultures and races. Thus, one nation
would become a threat to the lives of millions outside of its culture. In this scenario, the
security of the entire world must preempt that of one nation, which, by its very actions, ag-
gressed against the world. Consequently, extreme force, such as nuclear and chemical warfare,
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Thus, although the limits on the Council's power are not clearly
defined, the Council's power may extend to biological, chemical, and
nuclear warfare, if the severity of the situation necessitates such force.
These types of actions may provide an outermost limit. Thus far, the
Council has never approached this limit, but has conservatively exer-
cised its powers.
C. International Human Rights Law
The final potential limitation on the Council's chapter VII pow-
ers is prevailing international law. Specifically, international human
rights law may limit the counteractive measures the Council can in-
voke to restore or maintain international peace and security.
1. Defining Human Rights Provisions in the Charter
To achieve world peace and security, the drafters of the Charter
acknowledged that international economic and social conditions con-
ducive to peace had to be established. 92 The social conditions envi-
sioned by the drafters included the establishment of human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all. 93 In fact, many articles in the Charter
vest specific powers in the United Nations organs to aid in the pursuit
of this goal. Nonetheless, the human rights articles are vague, and
they lack the forcefulness of the chapter VII articles empowering the
Council.
The drafters first attempted to create a human rights document
in the form of a bill of rights.94 Although it was never completed due
to numerous difficulties,95 this bill provided the basis for the Universal
must be within the authority of the United Nations; otherwise, human rights for the rest of the
world would be non-existent.
92. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 303.
93. Id.; GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 244.
94. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 323.
95. The majority of this bill of rights contained uncontroverted traditional provisions,
such as guarantees of equality in the law with respect to life, liberty, and property. Id. at 324.
However, dissension arose with respect to the content of some provisions. For example, an
economic welfare provision, which emphasized "freedom from want," was criticized as too
broad to be expressed as a guarantee. Id. at 325. Additionally, the United States opposed
another generalized provision that guaranteed the right to public education, because it con-
flicted with the United States concept of separation of church and state. Id.
Probably the most difficult problem associated with this bill of rights was the issue of
enforceability: "Without effective sanctions, a bill of rights could not be made binding on all
states." Id. at 326. Indeed, the enforceability issue proved difficult in many respects. If the
enforcement system allowed review by an international court, it was doubtful that states would
accept the jurisdiction of an international court over their citizens, especially in matters di-
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Declaration of Human Rights ("Universal Declaration").96 Initially,
some drafters wanted to incorporate the Universal Declaration into
the Charter. However, the drafters rejected this idea for three rea-
sons: 1) the Universal Declaration failed to harmonize with the Char-
ter's articles;97 2) some drafters feared that only the uncontroverted
traditional provisions, such as equality before the law with respect to
life, liberty, and property, would be accepted by all of the member
nations;98 and 3) the drafters anticipated enforcement problems with
the Universal Declaration. 99
Despite their inability to incorporate the Universal Declaration
into the Charter, the drafters emphasized the importance of the Char-
ter's human rights provisions by placing the provisions "prominently
in the first Chapter among the purposes of the Organization." 100 In-
deed, article 1 lists the promotion and encouragement of human
rights and fundamental freedoms "without distinction to race, sex,
language, or religion" as one of its purposes. 0 1
Although the Charter declares the promotion of human rights as
one of its purposes, the drafters failed to define or enumerate what
constitutes "human rights and fundamental freedoms. °10 2 Instead,
the drafters intended that the United Nations would later define
human rights,10 3 and, to this end, the drafters granted broad powers
to the General Assembly and to the Economic and Social Council.1°4
For example, article 13 grants the General Assembly broad authority
to "initiate studies and make recommendations" to promote interna-
tional cooperation in the economic and social fields, and to assist the
realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 0 5 Article 62,
rectly against a state. Id. The same problem would arise even if enforcement was attempted
by a less formal tribunal, such as a commission on human rights. Id. Finally, voluntary en-
forcement by a violating state was absurd if that state was deliberately infringing the rights
guaranteed by the bill.
The subcommittee working on the bill of rights failed to resolve these problems. Id. at
327. In fact, suspension of committee activity in the summer of 1943 halted all work on the
bill of rights and on these problems. Id.
96. Universal Declaration, supra note 78; RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 327.
97. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 327.
98. Id. at 328. Consequently, subsequent expansion of the basic provisions would require
a formal amendment to the Charter, which would prove too difficult.
99. Id.; see also supra note 95 and accompanying text.
100. REPORTS, supra note 28, at 38.
101. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 3.
102. REPORTS, supra note 28, at 38; GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 247.
103. GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 247.
104. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 9-22, 61-72.
105. Id. art. 13, 1 l(b).
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like article 13, grants the Economic and Social Council the power to
"make or initiate studies and reports with respect to international eco-
nomic [and] social... matters."106 The Economic and Social Council
can also "make recommendations for the purpose of promoting re-
spect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all,"' 10 7 and must establish commissions to promote these human
rights and freedoms. 10 8
In addition to the powers granted to the General Assembly and
the Economic and Social Council, the Charter places obligations on
both the United Nations and on its individual member nations. For
example, article 55 provides that the United Nations "shall promote
... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and funda-
mental freedoms,"' 0 9 and article 56 requires that "[a]ll Members
pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation
with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in
Article 55."' 110 Once again, however, the Charter requires only gen-
eral pledges and obligations, with no specific guidelines.
The Charter neither affirmatively grants any organ of the United
Nations the power to enforce the Charter's human rights provisions,
nor sets forth specific United Nations actions that will ensure the pro-
motion of human rights. Rather, the Charter grants only vague pow-
ers to the organs of the United Nations, as the drafters intended that
its objectives would be defined and fulfilled in the future. Therefore,
the drafters employed such loose terms as "promote," "encourage,"
and "assist," when describing the duties of the United Nations' or-
gans, and avoided such terms as "protect," "safeguard," and "guaran-
tee.""' Thus, the actual Charter provisions provide little or no
guidance to deciphering the drafters' intended limits on the Council in
the exercise of its enforcement powers. Rather, "under the impact of
the war the major interest ... was ... in creating an international
organization which would be effective in maintaining international
peace and security .... 112 The drafters' words indicate that the
106. Id. art. 62, 1.
107. Id. art. 62, 2.
108. Id. art. 68. According to article 68, "The Economic and Social Council shall set up
commissions in economic and social fields and for the promotion of human rights, and such
other commissions as may be required for the performance of its functions." U.N. CHARTER
art. 68 (emphasis added).
109. Id. art. 55(c).
110. Id. art. 56.
111. GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 247.
112. Id. at 245.
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emphasis was on "making international police action effective," not
on securing human rights.113
2. Customary Law
The Council's power may be further limited by customary law1'14
due to its recognition as international law." 5 Additionally, the Coun-
cil's power may be limited by a basic principle of treaty law dictating
that international agreements, such as the Charter, must "be inter-
preted in the light of the rules of customary international law." 1 6
Generally, international law is drawn from explicit international
agreements, such as treaties, conventions, protocols, pacts, and ac-
cords. Customary law differs from these types of explicit agreements,
in that it is implicit by nature. Customary law evolves from "certain
maxims... consecrated by long use, and observed by nations in their
mutual intercourse."'"17
Explicit international agreements are binding contracts among
nations that often create legal rights and duties obligating the signato-
ries to certain conduct." 8 In general, such agreements are considered
legally binding because "they have been concluded by sovereign states
consenting to be bound." 1 9 However, multiple international agree-
ments with similar general provisions may generate customary law-
rules applicable even to non-signatory nations: 20 "[Sitates in and by
their international practice may implicitly consent to creation and ap-
plication of international legal rules."' 121
113. Id.
114. Customary law is a set of customs, each of which imposes an obligation, right, or
entitlement on a nation. Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International
Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1110, 1113-14 (1982).
115. See generally MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 9-41
(1988); JAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-14 (1990).
116. JANIS, supra note 115, at 11. In addition, commentators claim that some customary
law, such as that on torture, has acquired the status ofjus cogen, a preemptory norm that
cannot be avoided, even by treaty. Id.
117. Id. at 36.
118. Id. at 9.
119. Id. at 10.
120. D'Amato, supra note 114, at 1129.
121. JANIS, supra note 115, at 36. Difficulties may arise when implied rules, less definite in
their formation and usually subject to doubt in practice, have the potential to regulate states
without a treaty creating explicit obligations. Id. at 35-36. These types of rules create the
body of "customary international law." Id.
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3. Customary Human Rights Law and the Security Council
Before obligations arising from treaties or conventions can bind
non-signatories, the obligations must acquire the status of customary
law. 122 As discussed above, customary law may evolve from interna-
tional agreements, 23 and some commentators suggest that the con-
ventions themselves "constitute or generate customary rules of law"
by virtue of their generalized provisions.124 Proponents of this theory
note that they have not located a "single instance of a generalizable
treaty provision ... not be[ing] transmuted into customary law."' 125
These commentators argue that nations have "manifested by virtue of
their behavior over the centuries that generalizable provisions in trea-
ties become part of customary law directly."' 26 This theory clearly
supports the argument that provisions in the Universal Declaration127
have become customary international law. 128
A second source of customary international law emanates from
actual state practice.1 29 Even the ancient law of Rome acknowledged
an "[u]nwritten law consist[ing] of rules approved by usage for long-
continued custom approved by the consent of those who use it imi-
tates a statute.' 30 Under this theory, each state is considered both a
subject of international law and a legislator.' 31 States are subjects of
international law because their actions can be evaluated under ex-
isting international legal rules. 132 If state actions fail to conform to
122. BROWNLIE, supra note 115, at 11; Arthur Weisburd, Customary International Law:
The Problem of Treaties, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 44 (1988). Since customary law
ultimately rests on the consent of nations, no nation is legally bound to pronouncements by
others. Id
123. See D'Amato, supra note 114, at 1129.
124. Id. at 1129, 1131. "Generalized provisions" are those provisions universally applica-
ble to every nation, without exception. Id. at 1131. For example, prohibitions against slavery,
torture, and genocide could be universally applied, and need not be limited to the parties of a
treaty. This differs greatly from treaty provisions affecting concerns particular to the parties,
such as land titles, rights of water passage, and boundaries. In these latter instances, the provi-
sions apply specifically to an agreement between the parties and cannot be generalized to a rule
affecting all nations. Id. at 1131 n.83.
125. Id. at 1132 (emphasis in original).
126. Id. at 1133.
127. Universal Declaration, supra note 78.
128. Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not a treaty, it contains
generalizable provisions, and therefore can be considered customary international law.
129. JANIS, supra note 115, at 35-36; see also supra text accompanying note 121.
130. Id. at 35 (quoting THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, THE ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW
45 (1956)).
131. Weisburd, supra note 122, at 31.
132. Id.
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existing international rules, the actions may change the international
rules because the actions are the "seeds of a new rule." 133 In this
respect, state actions carry a legislative power. Consequently, one
source of customary international law is state practice.
Various sovereign activities constitute state practice. Treaties be-
tween states, orders from governments to military officers, orders
given by military officers, decisions of national courts, conventions,
and decisions by domestic courts have all been recognized as consti-
tuting state practice.' 34 To this list, of course, one could add national
legislation and administration, as well as treaties and conventions.
Indeed, state practice, motivated by a belief in its legally obligatory
nature, provides a consistent theory of sources of customary interna-
tional law. 135
When state practices directly contradict provisions of a particu-
lar treaty or convention, a question arises as to which rule deserves
priority. Advocates who support the position that treaties and con-
ventions establish evidence of customary law argue that, as one state's
practices cannot change customary law, state practices contrary to a
treaty or convention are irrelevant. 136 For example, these advocates
would argue that the fact that torture is prevalent in the world is irrel-
evant. The existence of conventions declaring torture illegal demon-
strates that laws against torture exist as customary law. 137 Others,
who support state practice as the true source of customary law, criti-
cize the argument that treaty content is customary law, because it
assumes what it seeks to prove-that the rule exists. 13  These com-
mentators further argue that the "legislative" role that each nation
plays in the international arena supports the position that state prac-
tice is the true underlying source of customary law. 139
Despite this conflict, assuming an entitlement is identifiable, the
133. Id. (citing D'Amato, supra note 114, at 1118).
134. Id. at 7.
135. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER arts. 92-96. One must consider the possibility that practice
that simply mirrors a treaty obligation is performed only because of a state's sense of obliga-
tion. However, if many states have treaties with a similar provision, one may argue that the
provision is customary by virtue of general consensus, and that the provision's general exist-
ence evinces an elevated level of consciousness with respect to its contents. See, e.g., JANIS,
supra note 115, at 39-40; BROWNLIE, supra note 115, at 6-7.
136. Weisburd, supra note 122, at 30-31.
137. Convention Against Torture, supra note 61.
138. Weisburd, supra note 122, at 30.
139. "The only way customary international law can change-and it certainly has
changed significantly in the practice of states over the centuries--is by giving legal effect to
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international community will attempt to maintain the entitlement t""
as part of customary law by responding to violations of it. 14' Unchal-
lenged violations of a rule provide the "seed of a new rule," which can
form new customary law. 1 42 To prevent a new law from evolving, the
international community protects the existing right by "declar[ing]
the nation that violates [the] entitlement a temporary outlaw and...
allow[ing] the nation or nations whose entitlements were violated...
to retaliate [by] disregarding one or more of the outlaw nation's enti-
tlements."' 43 Because of the difficulty in formulating rules to con-
strict the choice of entitlements that a wronged nation may employ in
retaliation, it appears that any of the outlaw nation's entitlements may
be deprived.44 However, "[tihere is a strong consensus that the same
entitlement may be violated."'' 45 If the wronged nation chooses a dif-
ferent entitlement, the deprivation must be proportionate to the initial
violation. 146
This seemingly harsh result reflects the fact that the entitlements
each nation acquires through customary law differ from that nation's
"interests." Interests are those things desired by a state, 47 such as an
internationally recognized prioritization among its entitlements mir-
roring its preferences. 48 Unlike entitlements, interests have no legal
departures from preceding customary norms." Id. at 31 (citing D'Amato, supra note 114, at
1118).
An interesting question arises as to whether state practice that violates international
agreements, but is denied by the state, could change international rules. For example, could
torture that is practiced frequently but usually denied by states ever affect the validity of the
United Nation's Convention Against Torture? Perhaps the secrecy of the torture suggests the
public attitude: that it is illegal, and its denial is an acknowledgment of its illegality. See
generally HUMAN RiGHTs IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY, supra note 84, at 48.
140. An "entitlement" is an obligation imposed or a right conferred on a state in the inter-
national arena. D'Amato, supra note 114, at 1113.
141. Id. at 1117.
142. Id. at 1118.
143. Id. at 1120. As a general guideline, retaliation is probably limited by human rights
law and preemptory norms. For example, retaliation for the invasion of a sovereign nation
could not be properly countered by randomly torturing individual citizens of that nation. This
general guideline is not meant to contradict the later sections of this Comment that explore




147. For example, the United States may have an "interest" in abolishing the international
oil cartels. Nonetheless, oil cartels, at present, do not violate any entitlements of the United
States. Id. at 1114.
148. Id. at 1114-15.
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relevance in the international arena. 149 Thus, the variation in "inter-
ests with respect to any particular entitlement... ensures the lack of
. . . communal consensus as to relative importance among entitle-
ments," -50 and prevents the formation of a rule dictating the choice of
allowable entitlements for retaliatory purposes.15'
If consistent and widespread violations of an entitlement are not
opposed, eventually customary law will no longer recognize that enti-
tlement.1 52 Assuming that human rights laws are entitlements and
part of customary law, a proposition that this Comment neither sup-
ports nor denies, the lack of retaliatory measures in reaction to viola-
tions contributes to the demise of their status as entitlements
recognized by customary law. 53 If this demise occurs, the Council
would not violate any customary law if, through exercising its sanc-
tioning powers, it denies a nation a particular human right recognized
only by treaties to which not every member of the United Nations is a
party. 15 4
Nonetheless, declaring that a "rule is not a rule of international
law merely because reparation does not always follow clear breaches
of the rule"'"5 fails to recognize that the "weakness of the interna-
tional legal system makes enforcement of rules difficult even in ...
relatively clear cases."' 56 One commentator, H.L.A. Hart, recognized
this weakness and proposed an alternative theory. Hart reasoned
that, by agreeing that international law is not binding due to its lack
of enforceability by sanctions, one merely "accept[s] the analysis of
obligation contained in the theory that law is essentially a matter of
orders backed by threats."'' 57  This theory identifies, and almost
149. Id. at 1115.
150. Id at 1117.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1117. This of course assumes that the violations are open and exercised as a
matter of claimed right.
153. Id. at 1118. "[If other nations] accept the violation, a new customary rule is on its
way toward being formed.... [The nations must] react to the violation of a customary rule...
to ensure that the violation does not replace the old rule with its opposite." Id.
This argument intentionally ignores the fact that individual citizens have rights against
their own states and third parties. Further, it does not address a situation in which the Coun-
cil selects individuals or members of a particular race in a particular nation that it is sanction-
ing. It only address sanctions against nations consistent with its powers under the Charter.
154. It must be noted that action of the Council is not "retaliatory" in the sense that it
seeks merely to punish. Rather, it constitutes allowable action under the Charter designed to
rectify the problems caused by violations of peace. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51.
155. Weisburd, supra note 122, at 9.
156. Id.
157. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 212 (1986). This theory supports the propo-
[Vol. 14:175
Chapter VII Powers of the UN.
equates, an obligation with the threat of a sanction or punishment for
disobedience. 158 Hart proposes a normative idea that assesses rules as
"guiding standards of behaviour."'' 5 9 This theory expands the "idea
of obligation [beyond]... rules supported by organized sanctions,"
60
and recognizes that states do not require the same threat of sanctions
that those bound to municipal and domestic law require. 16 1 Indeed,
the international community expresses these rules as obligatory, and
pressures states to conform. 62 Further, the international community
permits claims and insistent demands for compensation justified by
breaches of the rules. 1
63
Under Hart's theory, entitlements under customary law do not
lose their status as customary law simply because violators are not
punished. Perhaps, to protect against the depreciation of an entitle-
ment, mere identification of the violation will be sufficient to sustain
the entitlement's status as customary law.16 Thus, if human rights
law is customary law, and the Council deprives a nation of a protected
human right, it is conceivable that a violation will have occurred be-
cause mere violations of the rule will not terminate the rule.
However, as discussed above, the international community per-
mits the deprivation of an "outlaw" nation's entitlements by the "na-
tion or nations whose entitlements were violated.' 65 As violations of
human rights law infringe the entitlements of every nation, 66 the
Council's actions against such outlaw nations merely represent the
United Nations members' choice of entitlement deprivation. Thus,
sition that the Charter is not "law" because chapter VII's enforcement provisions are often
paralyzed by the veto power of the permanent members of the Council. Id. "Decisions of the
Security Council on all [nonprocedural] matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine
members including the concurring votes of the permanent members." U.N. CHARTER art. 27,
3.
158. HART, supra note 157, at 212.
159. Id. at 213.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 214. This idea recognizes that states are often peaceful for long periods of time,
regulated by rules not enforced by any central organ or backed by any organized sanctions. Id.
But, even in domestic law, a rule remains "law" even if it is seldom enforced.
162. Id. at 214-15.
163. Id.
164. This approach appears to be the reality in the international world with respect to
violations of human rights. Often, the international community identifies and declares certain
state actions to be violations, without sanctioning the violator. See Otto Friedrich, Master of
His Universe, TIME, Aug. 13, 1990, at 24 (discussion of Saddam Hussein and the use of poison
gas against the Kurds).
165. D'Amato, supra note 114, at 1120.
166. Id. at 1126.
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under currently accepted principles of international law, the Council's
use of its sanctioning power is not per se violative of human rights
law, even though it may deprive a nation of one of its human rights.
Consequently, customary human rights law cannot act as a per se
limit on the Council's enforcement powers.
a. Which Entitlements May Be Deprived
The position that the Council may retaliate against a nation by
depriving that nation of an entitlement implicating a human right is a
harsh one. 167 Allowing such retaliation ignores the fact that individu-
als, as well as states, have rights under human rights law.168
To alleviate the harshness of this result, perhaps not all rights or
entitlements should be subject to deprivation. Perhaps, as recognized
in the United States Constitution, certain rights are inalienable. Ina-
lienable, however, is not the definitional equivalent of absolute. 169 For
example, the United States Constitution protects life as an inalienable
right, 17 0 yet many states still employ the death penalty as a means of
167. For example, if the Council sanctions a total blockade of a nation under its article 42
powers, the blockade could ultimately implicate the right of each individual in that nation to
live and not die of starvation. See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 78.
168. JAMES W. NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (1987).
169. Webster's Dictionary defines "absolute" as:
1. literally, in a general sense, free or independent of anything extraneous.
2. complete in itself; whole.
3. unconditional,
4. existing independent of any other cause.
5. unlimited by extraneous power or control.
WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 7 (2d ed. 1983).
In contrast, Webster defines "inalienable" as that which "cannot be legally or justly alien-
ated or transferred to another." Id. at 919.
170. The United States Constitution protects the inalienable right to life because it embod-
ies the principles set forth in the Declaration of Independence. JOHN Q. ADAMS, THE JUBI-
LEE OF THE CONSTITUTION: A DISCOURSE (APRIL 30, 1839) 54 (1972) ("Now the virtue
which had been infused into the Constitution of the United States... was no other than the
concretion of those abstract principles which had been first proclaimed in the Declaration of
Independence-namely, the self-evident truths of the natural and unalienable rights of man
...."); see also E. DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY at viii
(1957) ("[T]he American Bill of Rights... was the vehicle whereby the political philosophy of
the Declaration of Independence was incorporated into the Constitution."). Specifically, the
Constitution incorporates the Declaration of Independence's pronouncement that "all Men...
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Lib-
erty, and the Pursuit of Happiness." McGowen v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 563, (1961) (quot-
ing the Declaration of Independence). Indeed, a number of Supreme Court cases uphold and
support this concept. See, e.g., id. ("And the body of the Constitution as well as the Bill of
Rights enshrined those principles [contained in the Declaration of Independence]."); Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) ("[T~he fundamental rights to life, liberty, and -the pur-
suit of happiness ... are secured by those maxims of constitutional law which are the monu-
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punishment. 17 1 Similarly, although constitutional due process proce-
dures guard the right to life, 172 in some instances, other considerations
conflict with this right and lead to its deprivation. Therefore,
although inalienable rights are powerful considerations, they are not
absolute and may be deprived.
173
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights reflects
the view that rights are subject to deprivation. 174 Although article 6
of the Covenant declares that "[e]very human being has the inherent
right to life," it qualifies this declaration by stating that "[n]o one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.' 75 The Covenant, like the
United States Constitution, does not declare this right absolute.
Rather, it protects only against arbitrary deprivation. 1
76
The preceding discussion on the death penalty assumes that the
individual deprived of life was somehow the catalyst who provoked its
deprivation. The situation is drastically altered if the deprived indi-
vidual is "innocent." Here lies the quandary with respect to Council
actions that implicate deprivation of the human rights of "innocent"
citizens of a belligerent nation. But, are citizens of a belligerent na-
tion truly "innocent," such that the Council's sanctions depriving
them of human rights is unjust? Many would answer in the affirma-
tive, but this Comment proposes an alternative view.
Individuals, as citizens of a nation, have the obligation to exer-
cise civil disobedience: "Unjust laws exist[,] shall we be content to
obey them, or shall we endeavor to amend them, and obey them until
ments showing the victorious progress of the race in securing to men the blessings of
civilization under the reign of just and equal laws .. "); Monogahela Navigation Co. v. U.S.,
148 U.S. 312, 324 (1893) (stating that the adoption of the Bill of Rights was to protect "those
rights of persons and property which by the Declaration of Independence were affirmed to be
unalienable rights").
171. Currently, 36 states allow the death penalty as a means of punishment. See THE
WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1991 (Mark S. Hoffman ed., 1990).
172. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. "[No person shall] be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty, without due process of law." Id.
173. NICKEL, supra note 168, at 17. "[Ihe weight of a particular right is relative to other
considerations at work in a given context." Id. One commentator, Ronald Dworkin, supports
this view by his theory that rights are "trumps." He suggests that, although rights generally
prevail in competition with other concerns, they do not always prevail. Id. at 16-17 (discussing
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 92 (1977)).
174. See Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 61.
175. Id. art. 6.
176. Id. If the Covenant intended to grant an absolute right to life, the sentence outlawing
arbitrary deprivation would be superfluous and unnecessary. Documents should generally be
read such that no particular clause or provision is redundant or superfluous. SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 65, § 46.06.
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we have succeeded, or shall we transgress them at once?" 77 Indeed,
"[i]f the injustice.., is of such a nature that it requires you to be the
agent of injustice to another, then ... break the law." 178 If citizens
observe their government engaging in actions that violate interna-
tional treaties or agreements, or in actions that may lead their nation
to war, those citizens have "the right of revolution; that is, the right to
refuse allegiance to, and to resist, the government." 179 If citizens fail
to exercise this right, 80 they must bear responsibility for any govern-
ment action that leads to retaliation. 8" By remaining silent, the citi-
zens support the government's action.
Placing responsibility for inaction upon those cognizant of their
government's wrongdoing is not an unjust result. What, though, of
the citizens who do respond, vocalize, or demonstrate objection, but
to no avail? And, what of the citizens who claim ignorance due to
their lack of accurate information of the true state of affairs caused by
misleading or censored news reports? Although the world may cate-
gorize these individuals as "innocent" victims, one must scrutinize the
legitimacy of this innocence. On balance, even these citizens must be
held accountable. With respect to the "misled," no one could accu-
rately judge the validity of their positions. Fabrications would mirror
truths, and reaching inside another's heart and mind to subjectively
determine whether sufficient doubts or suspicions existed to justify an
expectation of action against the government is impossible. The vo-
cal, but ineffective, citizens present the beginning of where hard deci-
sions must be made. Nonetheless, despite their unfortunate
predicament, they are not the truly "innocent" because of their capac-
ity to perceive and make decisions.18 2
Thus, the only truly "innocent" citizens are those incapable of
perception and differentiation of wrongdoings: the very young, the
177. HENRY D. THOREAU, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 350 (1972).
178. Id. at 351. At times, individuals must "do justice... cost what it may." Id. at 347.
179. Id. at 346.
180. Id at 344.
181. The citizens must bear responsibility, because blind resignation of conscience to the
government, and undue respect for the law, cannot exculpate the citizens from their obligation
to do what is right. Id.
Law never made men a whit more just; and, by means of ... respect for it, even the
well-disposed are daily made the agents of injustice. A common and natural result of
an undue respect for law is... marching.., to the wars, against.., wills, ay, against
... common sense and consciences.
Id. at 344-45.
182. The rationale for why these citizens must be held accountable is left for discussion in
the next section.
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very old, and the infirm. Injustice rears its ugly head when those in
these categories fall victim to retaliation for a wrong they could
neither perceive nor counteract, thus presenting a most unfortunate
and unpleasant dilemma.
b. Weighing the Interests
The dilemma of whether the truly "innocent" should ever be
subjected to the consequences of retaliation against an unyielding gov-
ernment in its aggressive stance poses a difficult problem. Nonethe-
less, the existence of an aggressor who could ultimately destroy not
only international peace and security, but a race or humanity itself,
offers a countervailing interest that demands serious consideration.
The preceding scenario pits the world's welfare against the lives
of the "innocent" victims caught in a belligerent nation. To weigh in
favor of the "innocent" citizens and protect their lives at all costs
reflects the view that pure and unyielding principles, regardless of the
situation, must guide all decisions. For example, this view rejects the
reasoning that, in order to save lives, one must drop a bomb on a
Japanese civilian city to stop a war that could potentially cost many
more lives.1
8 3
Although a system dictated strictly by principles and liberties is
preferable, blind valuation of liberties stalemate and paralyze nations,
such that liberties and principles are lost due to a nation's inability to
protect itself.1 8 4 For instance, Iraq's president, Saddam Hussein, not
only invaded a recognized sovereign nation, I85 but allegedly violated
numerous human rights of Kuwaiti citizens and foreign nationals. 1
6
If the world allows Hussein to use the human rights of his citizens as
a shield against retaliation, Hussein has been granted more rights
183. BERNARD BRODIE, WAR AND POLIcs 51 (1973). Brodie speaks of the conven-
tional bombing of Tokyo the night of May 23, 1945, which created a fire-storm due to the
number of bombs which were dropped. A fire-storm is a phenomenon in which flames create
strong winds and fan the fire into greater intensity. This bombing took the lives of 83,000 to
100,000 people, many from asphyxiation. Brodie compares this incident with Hiroshima. He
states that, although the one bomb dropped on Hiroshima is a comparable horror, it can
hardly be said that Hiroshima was worse, as the number of fatalities was substantially fewer.
Id. Although the Japanese people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki paid a terrible price, the raids
planned for Japan, only three months in the future, "would have been a blood bath for Japa-
nese and Americans alike." Id. at 54.
184. PLATO'S REPUBLIC 212 (G.M.A. Grube trans., 1974). "[E]xcessive liberty, whether
in the individual or the state, is likely to change to excessive servitude." Id.
185. A New Reality in Mideast: Now Hussein Is in Charge, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 3, 1990, at
Al, col. 5.
186. Lisa Beyer, Iraq's Power Grab, TIME, Aug. 13, 1990, at 19.
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than the rest of the world combined. By equalizing the liberties of
citizens in the aggressor nation with those of the rest of the world,
international response may be stalemated, rendering the world inca-
pable of adequately protecting its own liberties; the same liberties that
it respects in the aggressor nation.-1 7 The resulting paralysis could
unjustly advantage the aggressor nation and lead to a greater, rather
than decreased, deprivation of liberty.' ss Although a laudable aspira-
tion, simplistic pursuit of equalization of liberties represents a stan-
dard that is neither practical, nor safely obtainable, at the present
time. 19
Balancing the lives of "innocent" citizens of a belligerent nation
against the welfare of the entire world poses a difficult choice. Never-
theless, there is a realistic possibility that such a choice may have to
be made. The view proposed by this Comment offers a more
187. Cf PLATO'S REPUBLIC, supra note 184, at 209. Socrates argues that equalizing all
liberties would eventually turn any democracy into a dictatorship. Id. at 210-11.
188. Id. at 210. "Now insatiability for what [is] define[d] as the good also destroys ... that
insatiability regarding [liberty], and neglect of other things because of it." Id. Plato illustrates
how a democracy evolves into a dictatorship because the absolute quest for its finest posses-
sion, liberty, destroys the very rules by which people live:
Rulers... behave like subjects and subjcts ... behave like rulers.... [A] father...
behave[s] like a child and... fear[s] his sons, while the son behaves like a father ....
A resident alien is the equal of a citizen and a citizen the equal of a resident alien,
and so too a foreign visitor .... [E]xcessive action in one direction usually sets up a
reaction in the opposite direction.... So excessive liberty... is likely to change to
excessive servitude....
Id. at 210-12.
189. This is not to suggest that the world should not continue its quest to attain a world in
which the importance of each individual prevails. Even Thoreau, in Civil Disobedience, ends
his book on this optimistic note:
There will never be a really free and enlightened State, until the State comes to recog-
nize the individual as a higher and independent power, from which all its own power
and authority are derived, and treat him accordingly. I please myself with imagining
a State at last which can afford to be just to all men, and to treat the individual with
respect as a neighbor.
THOREAU, supra note 177, at 364.
This Comment's objection is that most nations do not recognize individuals as the "higher
and independent power," nor do they respect individuals and treat them with justice. Id.
Consider, for example, the massacre of protesting students in China's Tiananmen Square, the
Nazis' murder of six million Jews during the Holocaust, and Iraq's use of chemical warfare
against its own people. See generally Beijing Bloodbath, NEWSWEEK, June 12, 1989, at 24;
German Parliament Head Resigns After Hitler Speech, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1988, at 1, col. 1;
Otto Friedrich, Master of His Universe, TIME, Aug. 13, 1990, at 24. When a nation becomes
an aggressor, the world must respond and realize that, if the aggression is not controlled, the
aggressor's attitude towards individuals, as reflected by its treatment of its citizens, will be
directed at every individual of the world. Since all nations must protect their citizens, when
responding to aggression they must assume that their own citizens are at risk, and place the
safety of their citizens above those of the aggressor.
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favorable outcome than one espousing a simple and uncompromising
equalization of liberties. Specifically, this Comment's proposal pro-
vides that the survival of humanity, not of any one individual or
group of individuals, is the controlling factor in determining the out-
come of the balance, by analyzing life-cost and risk allocations.
Citizens who remain silent, because of fear 90 or ignorance,
91
must bear the risk of living in that society. This risk cannot be borne
by other nations of the world; otherwise, a belligerent nation could
use its silent citizens as a shield against retaliation. 92 This shield
would expand a hostile nation's rights vis-i-vis every other nation.
These "silent" citizens are thus transformed into military tools to pro-
tect the government. As a result, they must be treated as part of their
nation's military force.
The notion that the risk must be borne by the individual affected,
and not by the rest of the world, also explains why the vocal but inef-
fective citizens, as well as the truly "innocent," must lose in the bal-
ance. The hard reality is that these citizens must bear the risk of
failing to remedy their situations by taking actions, such as leaving
the nation.
The effects of this choice fall most severely on those who are
truly "innocent" and in need of protection. Unfortunately, when an
aggressor jeopardizes the survival of humanity, the need to rid the
world of the aggressor must dictate the proper responses. For exam-
ple, the world is cognizant of the fact that Iraq's President Hussein
has used chemical warfare against his own citizens and those of an-
other nation. 93 For the world to assume that Hussein will not em-
ploy other weapons of mass destruction, such as biological or nuclear
weapons, is absurd and irresponsible. ,94 This leader's aggression must
190. "Fear" refers to the fear of reprisal from the opposition. THOREAU, supra note 177,
at 350. "They think that, if they should resist, the remedy would be worse than the evil." Id.
191. "Ignorance" refers to those citizens who claim to have been "misled." Id.
192. "It is not a man's duty, as a matter of course, to devote himself to the eradication of
any, even the most enormous wrong.., but it is his duty, at least, to wash his hands of it, and,
if he gives it no thought longer, not to give it practically his support." Id. at 349.
193. Friedrich, supra note 164, at 24.
194. Cf PLATO'S REPUBLIC, supra note 184, at 209-10. Socrates depicts a society that
values every liberty equally at all times, such that no reason enters into the decision-making
process:
[The Nations] do[] not welcome true reasoning or allow it into the guardhouse; if
someone tells [them] that some [choices] belong to good and beautiful desires, but
others belong to evil ones, that one should ... pursue the former while the latter
must be restrained and mastered, [the Nations] den[y] all this and declarel that all
[choices] are equal and must be equally prized.
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be eradicated to ensure the peace and security of the world. Thus, to
prevent a potentially greater loss of human rights around the world,
part of the cost, unfortunately, may be the suspension or loss of
human rights of the "innocent" in the aggressor's nation.
Although an extremely harsh result, the survival of humanity is
dependent upon this view. For this reason, the United Nations must
be fully empowered to maintain peace and security. If peace is se-
cured, every individual's risk of living in a particular society is re-
duced. Some may argue that this approach sacrifices the law to save
lives. But if an aggressor, like Hussein, is allowed to survive and ulti-
mately destroy the rest of the world, who will be left to enjoy the
laws? This view, at a minimum, allows the potential for the survivors
to ultimately achieve the higher aspiration, and be able to make every
decision in light of their reverence for each individual's life on earth.
The member nations, in ratifying the Charter, granted power to
the Council. 195 Thus, they are on notice of the Council's Chapter VII
powers and cannot escape responsibility for actions that provoke the
use of these powers. If the world fails to empower the United Nations
with the ability to fulfill its goal of international peace and security,
the goal of protecting and promoting human rights will also fail.
For, how can a world engulfed in strife protect humanity? Humanity
includes every citizen of every nation, not only the citizens of belliger-
ent nations whose leaderships endanger the human rights of neighbor-
ing nations and, potentially, those of the entire world.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United Nations is a body of nations formed in the aftermath
of war, in an atmosphere of fear-fear of another world tragedy.
Thus, the initial intent and strongest component of the Charter is the
maintenance of peace and security in the world. In the years follow-
ing its formation, the United Nations pursued more lofty goals. The
United Nations not only encouraged human rights, but affirmatively
declared a "common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
Id.
In fact, as recently as October 1991, United Nations inspectors found evidence that Hus-
sein would have had nuclear capability within 12-18 months. This discovery came only
months after the Gulf War ended on March 3, 1991. See Tyler Marshall, Iraq Nearly Had
Own A-Bomb, U.N. Finds, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 5, 1991, at Al; Steve Coil & Guy Gugliotta, Iran
Accepts All Cease-Fire Terms, May Soon Release Some Prisoners; Schwarzkopft 'Major Step'
Toward Peace, WASH. POST, March 4, 1991, at Al.
195. U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
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nations" through the Universal Declaration, 196 and through its reso-
lutions, the United Nations condemned, and continues to condemn,
violations of human rights. 197
The Council's power seems to be limited only by interpretations
of the Charter and the actions of the United Nations itself. Only if
the rules of customary international law change to disallow depriva-
tion of entitlements will customary international law limit the Coun-
cil's actions. Although this is a powerful proposition which appears
to impose little restraint on the Council, the Charter must be consid-
ered in light of the underlying basic premise upon which it was writ-
ten. The Charter was written with the cooperation of nations for the
protection of nations and individuals. Thus, "any who place their
ambitions or their dogmas or their prestige above the peace of all the
world" must be restrained "by joint and effective action."' 198 When a
belligerent nation "hides" behind human rights, restraining the Coun-
cil betrays the rest of the world, risking its survival, and "use[s] [the
Charter] selfishly for [the] advantage of. . . one nation .... ",19
As technology develops, and biological and chemical weapons
become more readily accessible, small countries and groups may hold
the entire world hostage. The power of the Charter must be flexible,
such that response to new terrors is possible. The opinion of the
world should dictate, not merely one man or one country. It is only
through a united will that the Charter will prove successful. 200 This
unity of will provides the greatest limitation on the Charter, as it re-
flects the desires of the world, not merely those of the members of the
Council.
Anna M. Vradenburgh *
196. Universal Declaration, supra note 78, pmbl.
197. Consider, for example, the economic and diplomatic sanctions imposed on South Af-
rica in protest of apartheid. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY, supra note 86, at
51; see also Nuremberg, supra note 61; Convention Against Torture, supra note 61.
198. WATERS, supra note 18, at 18.
199. Id. at 16.
200. Id.
* With special thanks to Professor George C. Garbesi.
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